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INTRODUCTION.
There has been so much discussion of currency reform in recent years
that it may be proper to question the permanent value of our banking lav/s.
The student of banking is at once sti'uck by the great dissimilarity between
the American system and the systems of other leading commercial nations.
England, France, Gei-Taany, Austria flungary, Denmark and Italy all have central
institutions which constitute the heart of their bank structure. Here in the
United States, on the other hand, ve have developed a system of free banking
where the association of banks is due rather to the necessities of business
than to any legal requirement. We have a government treasury which receives
and disburses the public money while Europe leaves the fiscal agency of the
governments largely in the hands of great central banks with certain monopoly
privileges. Tlie bank act which forms the basis of our banking legislation
has a number of evident defects while the European countries have an establish-
ed plan which has been in successful optration for years.
The United States has passed through an unprecedented development in
which its social and economic conditions have changed rapidly and the staid
stability of older countries has been held somewhat in ridicule. This great
industrial change may account, in part, for the inability of our present banking
system to properly accommodate the demands of business. It certainly gives
us aanple reasons for not being bound down to century old customs and traditions*
However, the time is coming when all of our policies will be definitely fixed.
V/e have, firmly established all the fundamental principles of our government -
some at great cost. It is the American doctrine that no man or special
class of men shall ever enjoy an undue aavantage over any of their fellow men.
Any change in our present system of banking will necessarily follov/ these lines.

2It is the purpose of this paper to study the present banking system
in the United States and to consider its relative merits an-' defects; to
inquire into our iiunking experience and also that of the leading European
countries; and to determine on the advisability of establishing a central
bank in the United States.
THE NATIONAL BANKIMO SYSTEM.
American practice is based on the free banking principle, namely: the
idea of giving the people a choice as to the number of banks rather than the
granting of a legal monopoly to one group of individuals. Consequently, the
United States is the home of many banks organized and regulated by a federal
law. Closely following this lav/ are certain state hank acts under the
sanction of which numerous state associations are operated. The common law
right also allows the private banking business and although it is found all
over the Union the private bank cannot be designated as a characteristic
institution. The national bank is the typical commercial bank. It is the
only bank of issue and its principles are followed in the best state banking
laws. An idea of the number and importance of the three classe<3 of banks is
shown in the following table^ :
( See next page.)
Annual Report of Comptroller of Currency. December 3, 1906 p.' 59.
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THE NATIONAL BAMK ACT.
The national banking system owes its existence to the Civil War, The
law, which originated the most extensive system in the world - Mulhall est-
imates that the United States has one third the banking power of the world —
was a war measure. In 1861 the government was in great noed of money in
order to finance the war. Taxes had been increased, treasury notes had
been issued and a sale of bonds had been resorted to. Of necessity, bond
issue was the principal method of raising money. However, the uncertainty
of results greatly demoralized the bond market both at home and abroad.
Hence tihe Secretary of the Treasury, Salomon P. Chase, in his annual report
to Congress in 1861, proposed a plan b., which American capitalists and bankers
would be attracted by the bond sales. Banking experience had demonstrated
that the unlimited issue of notes by any and all banks v/t..s a pernicious practios
full of disastrous results. Secretary Chase took advantage of this condition
by suggesting that Congress pass a national lav; under which corporations with
the note issue privilege could be organized to do banking."^ Among the arguments
in favor of the new system he contended: 1. th:.t it would guarantee a
uniform note circulation; 2. that it v/ould establish an absolutely safe bank
note issue
J
and 3. that it v^ould secure a common interest in the disposition
of national securities. His provision for safety was fashioned after the
excellent Hew York state plan of requiring a deposit of bonds as the basis
of note circulation. At first the proposal v/as not welcomed in Congress
but as the scheme was discussed it found many friends among the members and
two years later - on February 25, 1863 - the national bank act Viras passed, ^
1. Finance Report 1861, pp.18 - 19,
2, Congressional Globe. 1863.

In the present paper it will he unnecessary to give a detailed history of the
act. Suffice it to say that the underlying principles still ronuin and the
few changes made have merely been minor alterations in order to meet nev/
conditions.
The act, as it exists today, is entitled " An act to provide a
national currency secured by a pledge of United States bonds, and to provide
for the circulation and redemption thereof. " It is evident that the
framers had in mind, primarily, the establishment of a national currency
which should be uniform and circulate at par in all parts of the Union.
They no doubt, expected it to be, ultimately, the only paper currency of the
country. Tlie v/isdorc of this idea v/ill be discussed in a later section.
National banks c^re under the supervision of a Bureau in the Treasury
Department knovv'n as the Comptroller's office. It is the duty of this office
to execute the national bank laws. Wlienever a group of individuals decide
to organize a national bank they must make application to the Comptroller for
a charter. There must be at least five incorporators and each must subscribe
for at least ten shares of capital stock at one hundred dollars per share.
This is necessary in order that the business may be governed by a board of at
least five directors. Among other important requirements in r-aking their
application the incorporators must also satisfy the Comptroller as to their
reputation and financial standing. Tlie capital required depends upon
the size of the sity in which the bank is to be located. The mdnimiar. capital
is |25,000 in places the population of which does not exceed 3,000; ^50,000
in tov/ns of 6,000 inhabitants or 16 S S j "'ii'100,000 in places the population of
1. National Bank Act as amended 1905, p. 3, Chapter I. sec. 1.
2. Instructions and suggestions of Comptroller of Currency relative to
the organization etc., of national banks. 1903. p 3.
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which does net exceed 50,000 and ^200,000 in cities with a population of
over 50,000. The capital stock must be paid in full v/ithin five months
after the conunencement of business and 50fo must be paid in before the Comp-
troller will authorize the corporation to begin business. Payments of
stock must be sworn and certified to by the President or Cashier and any
impairment of capital must be restored under the penalty of a receiver-
ship, ^
Before comnencinf^ business every national hank is required to de-
posit v;ixh the Treasurer of the United States " any United States registered
bonds, bearing interest, to an amount not less than one fourth of the capital
capital being f150, 000 or less, as security for their circulating notes."
Motes may be issued to an uiaount equal to the par vtlue of the bonds de-
posited. A redemption fund in lawful money equal to 5/1 of the circulating
notes is kept with the Treasurer of the United States, The Treasury acts
as a central redemption agency and all bank notes are redeemable at par.
National bank currency circulates at par in all parts of the Union due to
the fact that it is legal tender " in payment of taxes, excises, public land^
and all other dues to the United states, except duties on imports; and also
for all saJ-aries and other debts and demands owing by the United States to
individuals, corporations, and associations within the United States, except
interest on the public debt, and in redemption of the national currency."
In order to free these notes from competition and to insure a uniforra bank
currency, Congress passed a prohibitory tax of lO/i on all state bank issues. ^
1. For entire paragrapli - Ibid. p. 3,
2. national Bank act as amended. 1903. Chapter III sec-. 49 p. 12,
3. National Bunk act. 1903. Chapter III. sec. 62 p. 15.
4. Ibid. Chapter III sec. 8b. p. 21.

7Shareholders are held responsiblo ratably for the debts of the
corporations, each to the amount of his stock in addition to the capital ac
actually invested by -him. The numerous sections realting to the duties
of directors and officers might be discussed at length but such an analysis
would take too much space in this short paper. Hence, I shall iriake only
brief mention of a fev/ of the more fundamental sections of the national
bank act.
In order to maintain itself as a pure commercial bank, no national
association is permitted to lend money on realestate. This prohibition
is base- on the theory that a commercial bank cannot well meet current
demands when its laws are on long tim.e paper which is not readily convert-
ible. Another proper prohibition allows no bank to lend to any one
person or corporation a sum equal to more than 10% of its capital and sur-
plus. This tends to alleviate the dangerous practice of lending a single
party or corporation an unreasonable portion of the bank's funds.
It v/ould hardly be fair to the national bank act to ignore the
provision for supervision and examination of the associations incorporated
under it. As has been said "The treasury department takes admin-
istrative responsibility over national banks." There are sections re-
lating to "organization and powers of National Banks'\ " Regulation of
the Banking Business", " Extension of Corporate Existence", " Crimes" etc.,
which must be enforced. This is done through a system of examinations
carried on by natioisal bank examiners. A bank examiner inquires into
the condition of each bank in his territor}/ as often as shall be deemed
necessary and it is his duty " to make a full and detailed report of the
condition of the association to the Comptroller." At least five sworn
1. National Bank act 1903. Chapter. I sec. 11^ ,120, 121, p. 28 Sec.l||Q-^ 2^

stateinonts per year concerhiug the conditio: vi of every natioiiul Lank must
be made to the Comptroller by its officerts. These reports are published
by the Comptroller and the banking associations are required to print a
statement of their condition in their home paper.
V.'e have considered the relation of national banks zo the public.
They have also a connection with the government's fiscal operations. Un-
like most othtr countries the United States does net keep all of its money
with the national banks. In ether words it cannot be said that the American
institutions are the fiscal agents of the government. The moneys of the
United States are kept in the Treasury at V»'ashington and nine sub-treas-
uries. An independent treasury is the receiving and disbursing agent
of the government. However, the Secretary of the Treasury may deposit
public funds v/ith the national banks upon the deposit of United States bonds
or other security satisfactory to tlie Secretary. Tliese deposits are limit
ed to those of internal revenue and customs duties. I)i recent years the
large suns which have accuinulated in the Treasury at the expense of the
money narket have caused numerous embarrassments, the evils of v/hich I
shall treat of later. Before leaving this subject it may be well to note
that national banks have been of material b;id to the government on account
of th.eir interest in United States bonds. Under present conditions a
government loi:.n can always find a ready market amongst national banks.
MERITS OF THE PRESENT SYSTEJ/..
,
The national banking system has several cominendable character-
istics. "P^xperience has shovm plainly the gain secured by uniformity of
regulation and unity of supervision, - - - Bank credit is strengthened

by the fdct that issuing banks all rest upon the scune law uiiiverBally knov/n,
and under the some recognized authority, whose mode of operaxion is univ-
ersally understood."-'- All note issuing corporutions musL operate with
capital fully paid up. Their incorporators nust be men of good char-
acter and financial standing. Tlieir business is under supervision of a
department of the government v.hich sends examiners to every bank for the
purpose of making a unifona examination. Every bank must publish a list
of its assets und liabilities in its home paper. Although these state-
ments may not be carefully sxudied by many of the patrons yet the n.ere
fact of publicity under oath is en ononno us- improvement over the private
bank which seldom gives its customers an idea of the condition of its business.
It has been said that the framers of the bank act of 1863 had in
mind the establisiiment of u bank currency which shouid ultimately take the
place of a^l other paper issues, Tlie banking principle of note issue is
accepted by all the leading students of money and banking as being the correct
one. It has been urged that " the issuing government can secure a cer-
tain amount of revenue without resorting to the ordinary forms of taxation.
Over and against tliis fiscal advantage must be set the expense of getting
and maintaining the specie reserve necessary to insure prompt redemption
Of th-j notes." ^ There is also a question as to whether the issue of notes
is a proper functior; of governjnent. Fnataver may bo the truth of this
objection, it cannot be denied that a government issue can never be made
to fluctuate according to the demands of comiserce.
1. Dunbar " Economic Essays." p. 228.
2. Kinley, Money. Chapter XVII pp 386 and 37. »
3. Ibid. Chapter XVII pp. 356 and 57.

10—
Experience has demonstrated that paper issues left to legislative bodies is
apt to be in excess at times of stress and crisis. Sucli u condition in-
stead of giving the desired relief only tends to aujpnent t]ie peril. Banks,
on the othor hand, will try to keep their note issues in accordc^nce with
the demnds of business because over iissue means immediate redemption and
a loss of the cash reserve.
i
Experience has shown that the note issue of national banks is ab-
solutely safe. Never during the history of our national banks have note |
holders lost one dollar on account of the insolvency of a bank. ^ As has
been stated, our bank currency rests upon a permanent investment in United
States bonds, namely: Motes are issued equal to the par value of interest
bearing securities. This bond secured system has alv/ays been recognized
as safe, as the experience of the Bank of England and our own excellent
New York free banking system demonstrated years ago. Added to the se-
curity of the bonds is the 5% redemption fund of lawful money which is
always held in the Treasury of the United States. There is another feature
which contains the element of safety. Bank notes are accepted as leeal ten-
der by all national banks. The United States receives then for aj.1 govern-
ment dues except the payment of duties on imports. It is needless to
say that the action of the government insures a free circulation of the
notes in axl parts of the country as far as safety in concerned.
Besides the elements of safety and uniformity Professor Dunbar ^
says " in the course of a generation the national banking system has col-
lected a mass of legislation, judicial precedents, and rules of official
practice, v/hich make up a body of administrative laws of remarkable com-
1. Appendix Comptroller's Report Sec. 3. 1906.
2. Dunbar's "Economic Essays p 229.

"11
pleteness and value, known from one end of the country to the other - a
common possession, in which it is not impossible that all our people may
yet come to appreciate their common interest, "
DEFECTS OF THE PRESENT SYSTEI;!.
Wliile the merits of the national bank act are frequently not ap-
preciated there are some potent defects which should be remedied at once.
Of particular importance is the fact that we do not recognize the banking
theory of note issue. "There are two general uses for money or currency
in modern business. The first is for bank reserves against deposits or
note issue and for this use gold or its equivalent only should be employed." "
This unqualified deraand for gold or its equivalent is due to the present
status of gold as the standard in international ti-ade. " The second use
is for daily transactions. This is the proper field for the use of isank
notes. " ^ Bank notes must be imiaediately redeemable in uetallic money
if cri^dit is to expand and contract in accordance with business needs. Thus
in order to give the naximura service and perfonn their proper function bank
notes should be allowed to take on tlie same nature as a bank deposit. Both
are bank credits, payable on demand, and, therefore, one should be obtain-
able just as readily as the other. Under the present system, bank note
issue is so restricted and inelastic thut deposits are often drawn out much
to the discomfortury of the reserve. Bonk currency is needed exclusively
to supply business with a safe and adequate medium of exchange and therefore
the point of adaptability is highly important,
1, Annual Report of Comptroller of the Currency. Dec, 3.1^06^ p. 68,
2. Ibid p. 69,
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Mr. Frunk A. Vanderlip, Vice Precident, of the Mational City Bank of
Mew York has said; " In this year - 1S06 - there v/ere tliirty three weeks
in which the call ir.oney rate was 6fo or higher; at one time it touched GO^o.
High rates for money have by no means been confined to loans in speculative ii
markets. Through a considerable portion of tb.e year merchants and manu-
facturers liave been forced to pay 6'/. and sometimes well above that rate.
Money rates have been so high that the ordinary money market for investment
securities has boen much restricted," ^ These words of Mr. Vanderlip*
s
are words of complaint common in the m.outiis of all our leading bankers and
business men. In fact the demand for a m.ore elastic currency has caused
;j
a great agitation for banking legislation to remedy the evil. This was
recently evidenced by the action of various Chambers of Commerce, State and
'ational Bankers' Associations in recommending an iminediate action of
2Congress j.n the matttir. There seems to be a unarsimous consensus of
opinion in favor currency reform because our note issue does not respond
readily to t'ae varying demands upon it, namely: furnishing the proper ex"
pension and contraction of credit.
The United States has a great diversity of industries and among
her most important is that of agriculture. Agriculture is un especially
dominant factor in the western and southern states. Since crops come
and go with the seasons it is apparent that there will be seasonal demands
for money. In the south and west during the crop moving seasons there is
a great demand on the part of the buyers of agricultural products for loans
1. Magazine section "Chicago i\ecord Herald" Mr. 3, 1907. p 1,
2. See "Report of the Currency Commission of the American Banker's
Association." pomp. 1906, " Report special Committee of the
Chamber of Comicerce of il. Y. " pamp. "Currency" 1906.
^ = _ i

&rid discounts. Coincident v/i th this demand comes the need of farmers for
cash in order to pay their lahorerc. As a result the money reserves of
the country banks are reduced at the very time when the demand for loans
and discounts is increasing. In all, lAr. Vanderlip estimates that at least
|l50,000,0iJ0 more money is needed at this time. With the purpose of self-
preservation " each bank acts individually and looks only to its cv^n position"!
l'
at a time when concerted action would be more desirable. Hence every year
during the month of July the country banks begin to draw out their deposits
with their city correspondents.
Eventually '.^ew York banks must suffer their reserves to lower since
they hold the greater part of the money balances at this time. Wliile the
drain continues the only practical thing to do is to contract credit, resort
to the importation of gold and call on the secretary of the Treasury for more
goverrauent deposits. Recently it has been the policy of Secretary Shaw to
com© to the aid of the money market by a deposit of internal revenue collection^
His successor, Uir. Cortelyou, followed this plan in the recent panic in Wall
Street. Secretary Cortelyou enjoys a further privilege - by the Aldrich
Amendiiient , 190o - which also allows the secretary of the Treasury to de-
^
• posit customs duties as well as internal revenue. Th.e deposit from these
two sources of national revenue at the discretion of tlie secretary of the
Treasury, has been of great service but it has not prevented the inevitable
. rise of- money rates during the crop moving season. With this condition
follows not only a feeling of embarrassment and fear amongst the bankers
i
but also a check in industrial operations.
1. The Currency "Special Committt^e" of M. Y. Chamber of Commerce...
panp. 1906 p. 4,

iI
i
An opposite situation presents itself every spring. During the
v/inter and spring the domana for loans und discounts decreases in the agricul-
tural districts. Tlie farmer has paid his laborers and other expenses and
lias placed his profit in tae bank. Money accumulates in the vaults of the
country nanKer which he cannot lend to the limited business establishments
in his coiaaunity. Perhaps he is paying interest on time deposits and he
must then, as a matter of business necessity, hunt other markets in
order to make a profit. Naturally this surplus ie sent to the city banks,
who in competition for deposits, offer tlie country banker interest on his
balances. This affords him a siaall profit which the city banker must make in
addition to his own earnings. Consequently, in order to keep up a favorable
profit and less account the city banks lend the surplus in the great exchanges,
[
They do this of necessity because the invariable crop demand will soon come
and it v/ould hence be foolish to lend on long time paper. The abundance
of money in the exchanges, ut this time, causes a low rate of interest and
the speculators begin to enjoy their annual "spring boom". In recent years
this " spring boom" has tempted some of the more venturesome out-of-town
bankers to enter the city loan market. The great danger of this practice
is the fact that the inexperienced country bankers are far away from the
market, v/hich added to their unfatvdliarity with the speculative markets might
result in severe loss.
Most economists and business men suggest that we change our
bond secured circulation scheme in order to better the evil
.
of inelasticity.
As it is, our bank circulation is tied to the public debt. This not only
makes it neceiisary to maintain a perpetual debt but also discouriiges cir-

culation as government credit rises. In other words as the credit of the
United States rises, the inducement to buy bonds for note issue decreases
due to the little or no profit accruing. Some figures prepared by the
government will i:lustrato this point.
The average net price monthly, of 2% consols of 1930 fluctuated
during the year 1906 from 103.075 in February to 105,090 in September. At
the minimuin price during the year (103.075) the profit on circulation was
1,160> if loans could be placed &.t 6%, At the sane money rate the profit
on circulation based on bonds at 105,090 was .982/'.. The average rate of
profit, based on the average cost of bonds, monthly, during the year ended
October 31, 1906^ was 1.09% at 6^ money, These figures demonstrate that
"our bank note issue depends upon the investment conditions of the United
2
Stattis bond market rather than upon the conditions of trade."
There have been inany complaints from the south and west on account
of the lack of banking capital. This was especially true before the law of
1900 which allows the incorporation of national banks v/ith ^25,000 capital
in towns of 3,000 or lebs inhabitants. The effect of that provision is
3indicated in the following tables:
( See next page.)
1. Annua^L iveport of Comptroller of the durrency. Dec. 3, 1906, p. 19.
2. The Currency "Report Special Committee of the ChaTn--.er of CoKimerce"
ptii'ip. 190t) p. 7.
3. Report (.^oraptroiler of the Currency . Dec. 3, 1906 pp 30 and 31,

—16—
o
r-i
CO
o
o
o
o
o
o
a
-a
•H
o
3
o
•H
+->
•Si
:
'r-i OJ'
.
O C ,
o
o
;
i
si
•H
o
O'
o,
^1
-p;
„ i
•-3
"I
I
<D
8'
o,
o'
a-)
'
o
9'in
^ 1
00 '
ro
-J*
,
^
LT) .
o o
o oO oo,
o
o
r-i'
fHj in
00
CO '
0"»
in
,
00|
00
i
00'
OJ
^1
o'
o
O'
o 8:O i
inj
o_; COj
O in CO
,1
1
O" Oj
O! O,
o! 00
o
Oi
O, t-i
a>
i oO
-Hi
9'
00
9
'
OO
CM
3,'00
CM,
OJ
CO : jO
5h '
3
i
+->
CO
I l.i Si
r"
'
to:
o
iH
SI
S;
Mi
0)
•ill
o
,
CO '
3 ,
CO
«3
,
CM
> I
in!'
Si'
I i
o' O. O 8* 8^
1
o' o
.
8'
o 1 u^, ini in
.
8' Oi in
<-*i OOj h! O i IT,CO ' oo' CM O '^^ in
.
in
CO COJ CO i
Si in' OJ^i
i
rH' Hi
i
i
i
\
i
1
1
i
i
..I
1
-1
i OJ
CO
,
rH' O ' ^. f
H, O 'Hi c>Ji
CM ^: in;
1
1
1 i 1
Oj"
o
•H
-P
U
•H
«M
•H
(Q
siHO
fx.
N I
1ito
I
o!
> I
CJ
c
o
•H
P
KJ
N
•H
§itoj
Si
P
si
)
-p
'
j
i
a'
si;
Oi
I
<
i
o
,
9'in
oOi
'-n
rH
,
I
o.
. t
o
r-i
-P
Ji
U
•H
'M ; ID
•H
" I
r-1 P
1
o
,
ol
in 1
CM,
81
-Hi
I
s oio i
cJ 0:0
oio Si
Si in Vn
i
I I
0'
8i in
OJ
rH
I
i
si'
-^1
oil
Si'
il
o
o..
oo;i
ojji
COj!
_,.i
i -
CO,'
*)
I
"il
o

-17
From the above it will be seen that there has been a sniail increase in
uhe number of banks during the past six years. I"' conside rating the in-
crease the conversion of state banks must be taken into account and therefore
the actual gain in banking; capital has not been as great as it appears at
first sigiit. By far the greatest number b.ave been organized in the Middle
Vfesterii, V.esterij and Southern states. However, the west and south are still
deficient in ranking facilities.
It has always been xhe policy o*' conservatives to "go slov/" in the
development of a nev/ country. Conditions must be learned and that knov/ledge
is only acquired by experience. Hence we must not be surprised that the
eastern lender is rather reluctant to enter a more uncertain loan field when
his own state is still developing. As a result the south and west are
working out in a large measure their own salvation. State banking laws have
been passed which allow the creation of banks with snail capital. For ex-
ample state banks v/ith a minimum capital of v5,000 are allowed in Kansas,
Nebraska and the Dakotas. These lawF v/ere undoubtedly passed to satisfy
local conditions. It sliows that many towns capable of development and in
need of a bank cannot afford to organize a national bank with even ?25,000
capital. Added to this, is the hardship of purchasing United States bonds
equal to at least 25'/!! of the capital. It seems absurd th:j.t a western or a
southern town v/culd send some S6,000 to the east in order to i>ivest in nearly
profitless bonds when all of the money is so badly needed at hone.
The railroads have done much to develop the west. They are just be-
ginning to develop the south. No master how important transportation is,
it cannot do much good for a country unless the credit machinery is' also there.

-la-
in order to develop towns and cities and to establish markets for the farmer
there must of necessity be a supply of capital and credit to carry on
operations. In tho se the south and west still se 3in to be deficient
no twithsta riding the lielp of the act of 1900. It has often been questioned
whether even this partial help will ultimately be for the best. Professor
Duhbar said that " any change in capital should be in the direction of
consolidation rather tiiun subdivision." This brings up the interesting
question of brancli banking which vn.ll be treated in the nex'c section.
VARIOUS SYSTMS PROPOSED.
Numerous changes have been suggested with a view to securing the
desired elasticity of note issue. Economists, financiers, business i.ien
and treasury officials have all preseiited their pet schemes. Among those
offered are many feasible ones and their principles range from that of
allowi-ig any bank to issue any amount of currency to the proposal of grant-
ing the note issue privilege to but one central bank. It is obvious that
some would revise our system with its law precedents and established cus-
toms by adopting an altogether different one; others would improve the law
in order to meet new conditions. In considering the followi.ng proposals
it is necessary to be very brief and we shall, therefore, confine ourselves
to some of the plans suggested during the past decade. Nearly all of the
proposals contain the element of branch banking and so this subject should
be treated first. A gret t many claim that the establishment of brancli banks
under national law would tend to solidify and strengthen the banking interests.
To some sucli a result would be most welcome, to others it would seem a
1. Dunbar "Economic Essays" pp. 236 - 37.
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most deplorable state of affairs. It is urged that branch banks are common
in all countries of importance except the United States and tihat their ab-
sence here is due to the prejudice aroused during Jackson's war on the
Second United otates bank. This opposition grew out of a fear oi the "moriey
power". Among the arguments in favor of branch banking are: 1. From a
banker's point of view it is more economical. Like other forms of business
a consolidation simplifies the management, supervision and policy. 2. From
the general public's point of view, it v/ould tend to equalize rates or, the
theory th.at moriey distribution is unequal at the present time because the
rate is not adjusted to the supply. In branch banki^ig the interest rate
will tend to seek a cormon level and place all borrowers on the sante foct-
ing. The proof of this is found in the experience of Germany, Scotland,
Belgium and Holland. 3. Bankers would have a greater diversity of loan fields
and would not be as liable to have their loans in one or tv/o lines of bus-
iness. This v/ould tend to make banking safer and reduce losses to a
minimum.
'
'Lost economists and banking students are advocates of this system.
There is no doubt that branch banking would place capital where it is needed
and it would relieve some of the western and southern sections from high
money rates. Small bankers oppose it and it has been urged with no little
weight that there would be a great practical difficulty in securing local
managers who possessed tanking knov/ledge as well as local experience. There
seems to have been no such difficulty in other countries and it looks reason-
able that a competent local manager would be just as available as are the
directors who supervise the present village bank.
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One of the oldest suggestions offered i^s a solutior. for inelasticity
is the proposal to repeal the 10/1 tax on state bank issues. Ever sir.ce the
passage of this prohibition tax state bankers have been fighting for its
repeal and many of them still question the constitutionality of such a tax.
Recently, L!r. E. F. Parker, ^resident, of the T^ev; York Produce Exchange Bank
has been very active in arousing the £.- .ate bankers of liis state. ^ He
insists that state banks are not getting a square deal an;) that they are
just as safe and conservative as their national competitors. He would re-
peal the 10% prohibitory tax on state issue and allow state institutions to
issue notes on approved security. He maintains that the critical condition
of our finances at the time of the passage of the prohibitory tax is the
only reason that the /jnerican people ever sanctioned it. If state and
national banks were required to deposit bonds, it is evident that the gov-
ernment bond market v/ould work more and more against the issue of bank notes.
If the issue privilege of both state and national banks were not placed on
the same basis there is no doubt that complications would arise which would
rot better conditions but rather cause a demand for moro remedies.
Another proposal, Vi'hich is trongly urged by Mr. Theodore Gilman in
his book on "A Graded Banking System," would incorporate clearing houses
under federal law. Th.ese associations beside their function of securing
economy in the payment of balances would render a still greater service by
issuing notes in times of financial crises. Circulating notes would be
issued upon the deposit of m.arketable bonds, stocks, bills of exchange,
promissory not^^s and other evidences of debt as collateral security.
1. Moody's Magazine, Dec. 1906. Vol. IXC Mo. 1, p. b3.
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Mr. Gilman would incorporate clearin^r houses in the principal cities of each
state and eacii association would be given the pov/er to ruccivo commercial
assets from xhe hunks of that state and issue notes to 75% of their (assets)
par value. The amount alloted euch bank should never be more than its
capital stock. These notes would only be issued ir. case of emergency and
would be guaranteed by the bank, by the clearing houses of the state and
lastly by the clearing houses in the United States. The scheme is fully pre-
sented in Bill number 3338 which was introduced in the House of Represent-
atives in 1896. Mr. Charles Parsons of the St. Louis state Bank said at
that time (l8i'6) that federal clearing houses empowered to issue £100,000, OCD
of currency in 1893 " would have saved one half or two thirds the ill ef-
fects of the panic."
The advantages of incorporated clearing houses mentioned by Mr.
Gilinan are: 1. that safety v/ould be insured by the actual pledge of approved
security in the hands of the clearing houses which would act as trustees for
note holders; 2. that conservative action on the part of the loan committee
in accepting good collateral v/ould be guaranteed on account of the contin-
gent liability to which the members 'would be subject; 3. that the legal
reserves of the banks would be kept intact in times of stress because they
could resort to the emergency currency issue. As it is a slight loss of
cash equal to o'' of the deposit liabilities will produce a monetary crisis.
Tlie sciieme would establish a cooperative system as opposed to a competitive
system and would alleviate the action of every individual bank striving to
strer.gtiien itself at the expanse of its competitors.
1. Hearings of Committee on : anking and Currency on Currency Reform
1898 - 99 p. 9/

The i'/xC Cleary iiill, introduced in the fifty fifth Congress,
second session, has given rise to much discussion and cominont. The main
provisions of the bill are as follows: It would leave the fiscal oper-
ations of collecting and disbursing revenues with the Treasury 'department
i|
but would create a new division of Issue and Redemption. This division ,
would keep all cash of the government in excess of .^5, 000, 000 for the pur-
pose of redeeming United States notes, Treasury notes and certificates. A
nev. currency known as national Reserve llotes v/ould take the place of the
Greenbacks, these notes bei'ig issued to national banks upon the surrender
of an equal amount of Greenbacks. Every national bank would be compelled
to take the Reserve '.lotes to the amount of 25°.-. of their capital stock.
As compensation for xhe redemption of these Reserve I'otes the Lie Cleary
bill would give banks the privilege of issuing notes upon general assets.
The plan of issue can be better understood by the following illustration.
j
Suppose a bank were capitalized for -'^100, 000. By the IcCleary Bill it v/ould
be required to take out at least $25,000 in bonds ( present law) against which
it might issue ,'125,000 in notes and an additional ^25,000 upon approved com-
mercial assets. This issue might be increased in proportion to the increase
of bonds and ryserva notes unxil the secured and unsecured notes and Reserve
liotes wex-^e each equal to 40% of the capital. Thus a ylOO.OOO bank might have
,
|80,000 in bank circulation and |40,000 in Reserve "otes. Any issue above
this amount would be subject to a tax of one naif percent a month. Mr.
McCleary would also authorize banks of sufficient capital to organize branches,,
1, H, I\. 972h. 55th Congress 2nd session "Hearings of Coninittee on
Banking and Currency relating to change of Currency System. 1898 -99,
p. 42,
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T'.ie Currency Connnission of the Ajnericun Bankers' Association on
November lb, 190k. recoin; lende.l a plan for currency revision which was in-
troduced in the last Congress, It would modify the present banking
system by the introduction of a graduated tax on so-called "credit notes."
In brief their plan is this. A national bank which has been in active
business for one yeur and which has a surplus equal to 20/1 of its capital
shall be allowed tc issue "credit notes" under the following restrictions.
Banks may issue notes equal to 40^0 of their bond secured circulation but
not to exceed 2b% of their capital stock upon the payment of a 2^% tax on
such average circulation outstanding. In case the present proportion of
unmatured United States bonds to the total capitalization of naticmal banks
shall diminish, credit notes shall be increased to a greater percentage
of its lend secured notes. A further issue in excess of the amount first
mentioned ( equal to l%fo of the capital) might be circulated subject to
a b% tax. The total bond-secured notes and credit notes shall at no time
exceed the capital of the issuing bank. It is estimated that the riglit to
issue notes equal co 25% of the total capital stock of national banks,
would furnish ample emergency currency. Credit notes would be guar-
anteed by a gold redemption fund deposited with the Treasurer of the United
States equal to 5/' of the circulation (credit). Daily redemption would be
provided through the agency of certain designated city banks. The bankers
also demand that all government moneys above a working balance shall be
deposited daily in national banks without the usual collateral requirement.
Fisk and Robinson in their "Monthly Bulletin of Investments" for December
1. Report of Tlie Currency Coinmission of the American Bankers' Asfiociation
1906.
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Another proposal uado during the past year is that of the special
coinmittfie of the Ghara. or of Commerce of I'ew York \vho suggested the creation
of a central bank of issue. This committee regards a central bank as
being "the bes^ meajis of providing as elastic credit currency, the volume
2
of which could never be excessive." This bank \.ould be under tho con-
trol of xlie Government and v/ould have branches in all of the leading com-
mercial cixies of the country. It should have a capital of ul least |50,000,0(3D
and its stock mighx be ov/ned by private i-'dividuals or by the various banks
of the country. Ix vould be a bank of banks and a fiscal agency for the
government. At least a part of its board of directors should be appointed
by the Presidenx of xhe United States thus establishirig a close connection
with the gcvern;;;enx. The ban!: would act as a national treasury end receive
and disburse all public roney tlirough its various branches. As a central
bank of issue, this institution would net necessarily take tlie note issue
privilege avay from Natior.al banks. Sucli a change, even though desirable
at a later time, ...ould tend to lov/er the value of United states bonds and
would be unfair to the present national banks which ov^n bonds, the face value
of which in over ^?oOO,000,000 and whose market value is largely due to
the requirements of the ;iatio;ial Bank Act. The bank would, hov/ever, act
as iM agency iii supplying necessary credit currency in an emergency. In its
operations it should be "managed not exclusively for private gain but for
tne public good as well." ^ the reuaind.r of this paper, we shall
consider the feasibility of this plan and the advisability of taking it up.
1. "The :;urrency" Report by Special Coiuaittee of G^%aber of Coinxiierce of Mew
York. pamp. 1906, pp.9 and 10 and appendix p. 28.
2. Ibid p. 9.
3. Ibid p. 9, .
"
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We shall note its various advantages and disadvantages as expori):eced in
Europe and iii our ou-n ' country.
Before taking up a discussion of the banking experience of various
countries, \/e shall sujn up, in brief, the advantages of central banks. This
is well shown in the Cotamittee Report of the New York Ghain'-er of Goimnerce.
The banks of England, France and Gennany have been highly successful in sat-
isfying both the needs of conrnerce end of their respective countries. It is
coiairionly maintained that a great central bank is able, in times of stress,
to prevent those sudden fluctuations in the rate of interest v/hich, in the
past, have pre /od sc disastrous. The interest rate v/ould be more steady and
in case of extraordinary demands on industry, a bank witli large resources,
could at least prevent the present inflation and contraction of the currency.
As an improvement in government finance a central bank would .supplant the
cwnbersome sub -treasury system and the m.oney of the country would alv/ays be
at tae disposal of the industry. This v/ould alleviate the inflation and con-
traction no\7 common in the receipts and expenditures of public money.
EXPERIKMCK II! ELTkOPEAN COUHTKIES.
THE BAIJK OF ENGLAND.
The Bank of England is the oldest of existing banks of issue. It may
also be characterized as the most important of modern banks on account of its
1. Atfield. English & Foreign Banks. Dubbar. Theory & History of Banking.
Bagehot. Lombard Street. Gilbert on banking. Vol. II p. 113.
Clare. Money ^'arket Primer, part 1. Fiske, The modern Bank p. 279.
Clare. A. B.C. of Foreign Exchanges Gilman, A C-raded Banking System p. 14.
p. 104. Lawson, History of English & Irish Bnks.
Conant, History of Modorn Banks of Pal -grave. Rank Rate tind the money i:iar
Issue Chapt. 4 ft 5. ket.
-iistory of Banking in all nations Vol II, Syke. Bank'g & Hurrency Ch. IX & X.

peculiar position us the center of the v/orld's hanking systems. Situated in
the heart of the international money market, due to England's enormous com-
merce, it has beco-e the ftreutos^ distributor of the precious metals. "The
old ludy of Threadnecdle Street", as the bank is often referred to, was es-
tablished in 1694. Fngland was ut war with France and the English treasury
was in a very deple-c-.d condition. In order to facilita'ce the necessary
loans, William Pattsrson a Lor.don merchant, proposed that the Crov/n in-
corporate a large joint stock bank. This bank was to be -iven the ex-
clusive ri[p.t of note issue vdthin a radius of sixuy fivo miles from London.
In return for "onis privilege 'uhe Crown v/as to be given a loan of 1,200,000
pounds. The mcnied men of the realm were very much opposed to the scheme
because they feared that its success would mean a decrease of profit in
the loan business. L';any objected to the monopoly feature of the bank and
declared that the country would soon be at the mercy of the money power.
The more cautious feared that the bank v/ould be tempted to give speculators
an over-abu;.dance of credit and so hamper rather than promo-.e legitimate
industry. Against this opposition was a strong party which urged that the
Bank of England would relieve the government from financial embarrassment;
that the rate of interest would be decreased and usurers would be driven
out of business; the value of land would rise in response ^o the ex-
pansion of credit; and that the people would be brought in closer touch
v/ith ihe government. The bank bill was passed in Parliament on April
2b, 1654 and King William immediately went to the House of Lords to give
his royal assent.
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Until 1844, The Bunk of England enjoyed the note issue privilege
with 72 joint stock banks and 207 private banks located in the country
districts. Ever since the Bank was chartered, the public had complained
that it axul its associates were frequently tempted zo overissue which
brought on conD-erciul crises. In answer to this univorsal objection of
the people, Sir Robert Peel introduced a bill in Parliament the purpose of
which was to limit the note issue privilege. ^ Under it no bankers were
to issue notes payable to bearer on demand except such bankers as on Jilay
6, 1844 were issuing their own notes. In case any country bank ceased
the issue of its notes the Bank of England might increase its issue to the
extent of two thirds of such elapsed issue. The Bank of England was
divided into two departments: 1. The Issue ^spartraent and 2. the Bank-
ing Department. Securities 'to the amount of I'i.OOO.OOO pounds were to
be placed in the Issue Department and notes were zo bo issued to this amount
and transferred to tiie Banking Department, All notes issued beyond the sum
pounds
of 14,000,000^wero to be secured by the deposit of gold and silver equal
in amount to the excess. All profits on the issue of notes beyond
14,000,000 pounds were payable to the Crown. England has experienced
the same evils of inelasticity as the United States, due to the above pro-
visions, and during the years of crises in 1847, 1857, 136*3 and 1873. the
governinent Wu.s obliged to remove the note issue limit. At present tae law
governing the Bank of England is essentially the sarae as it was in 1844.
The Bank has a central office at London and its branches ure located in all
parts of the Kingdom. It acts as the chief financial agent of the state
and perforns the ordinary functions of a government treasury.
1. Syke "Banking & Currency" p. 77 Bank Charter 1544.
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Tlie paid up capital of the Bank is larger than that of any other
banking institution in the world. The capital is 14,1353,000 pounds and
the "Best" or surplus is somewhere in the neighborhood of 3,000,000 pounds
more, thus ixxking the total capital about 17,500,000 pounds. The cap-
ital stock is invested in governuien^ securities and fonns a basis for
that parL of the notu issue wiiich is not provided for by the deposit of
bullion. The management of its affairs continues in private hands and
it is the pride of all England that this Board of Diructors decide their
policy more in accordance with the public good than for private gain.
In a study of the Bank of England, it is well to consider the posi-
tion of this great institution in the v/orld's trade. As the center of
the international money market it is constantly liable to sudden and large
demands for specie for export. " It practically holds the specie reserve
of the entire country. It is a banker's bank whose main business is to
receive deposits from otlier banks and to rediscount comiaercial paper and
other forms of loans for its associates. On account of this great ob-
ligation to support the credit of depositing banks v/ho in turn support
the credit of their customers it keeps an enormous cash reserve.
The English law does not compel banks to keep cash reserves.
xHowever, experience has taught them that they must always have available
a considerable auiount of money. The country bank deposits in the ci'cy
banks", the city banks in the London joint stock banks, and the London banks
in the Bank of England. No interest is paid cn deposits yet zho banks
find it advantageous to deposit a part of their funds at oii available place
upon which "chey can draw at any time. Such a system establishes a safe
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and convenient means of making payments. Experience has taught the Dir-
ectors of the Bank of England that they should keep u cash reserve cf 40/(.
or more of their aggregate deposits in order to have a safe supply for the
ordinary demands of their customers. It is interesting to note how the
Hank maintains ita reserve. Tno Bank has her autumnal drain just the same
as Mew York banks and she suffers a similar loss of reserve. It is at
this time that the relation of the bank rate and the money market is con-
spicuous. Evidently tiie Ba)ik charges its minimtun discou)r: rate on
comjnercial paper of absolute security. Paper of inferior security is
charged a proportionally higher rate. The general rate of discount is
usually fixed for the week following by the Directors at their Thursday
meeting. The rate rests, primarily, upon the naturo of the reserve. If
the reserve is too great in proportion to deposits, the directors pubj.ish
a low rate vvhich is apt to attract borrowers. On the other hand if the
reserve is lowering, the rate is raised in order to encourage horrov/ing.
English banks have a common practice of rediscounting paper. Thus
a bank whose loans are heavy vdli resell its papers to another at a lower
rate and make a small profit v/ithout losing any funds. Their action
(discounting banks) will depend primarily upon \/hat the Bank of I^ngland
does in the matter. When the gold current is against England, it is
the practice of tiie Bank to raise the discount rate. This tends to
make the export of gold unprofitable and encourages continental bankers
to buy up loiidon paper thus turning the exchange in favor of England.
Hov/ever, tiie Bank cannot use this v/eapon effectively unless the open rate-
i.e. the rate charged by London bankers - follows the Bank- rate.
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This is due to the fact that London banks are the real competitors in bidding
for bills of exchange. London bankers always find it to their advantage,
however, to follow the bunk rate because the interyst thau Lhoy pay their
depositors depends upon the official rate. The Bank might also enter
the market as a borrower and force the open ra^e to follow its ov.n.
The Rank of Englai;d does not provide the people with, an elastic
currency. Bankers who nsod gold for exporx will either draw gold on their
account or present bank notes which are always redeemable in gold. Tlie
bank cannot issue notes above 17,500,000 pounds except by depositing gold
equal to the excess. Consequently as gold is v/ithdravm from the country
tu© notes ii; circulation are apt to be reduced together with the reserve.
The Bank of England must then of necessity keep nucii gold in her vaults
and the only way to accomplish ix is by the Bank raising the discount rate.
Recently when the Banlc reserve had fallen to about 35/c of the deposixs the
directors advanced tue rate to 6%. This stopped the exportation of gold
to the United States but it also proved a great discouragement to the
London borrowerwho is used to a 2/1, 3/, and seldom 4% rate.
In the following table is shovm the average note circulation of
the Bank of England, in groups of ten years from 1845 to 1900.
5t^^£,s
• ^
Circulaxion
1855_ "64
_
"
_20,38d, 5'OCi
'
'lB65__ 74_ 24, 027", 500 J'
ISTb
_84_
- ^~
J770307700"~ _
1_8B"5" j- 24 ~ 2jt]j}3¥3_j_400
_189:5_ —JLi^£ C li'LL'^iiO , 9 24" ~
1845 -"-1^00": " 23,7267100
Bullio n in is sue
?1476Y5',000__""_
^
r37645', OqO
T97356',£00 " "
_
_2£,43'6,000 *"
__22_, ass^.^oo
" ™
_
34,14S_,000
"
"20,6"l3,0*00
The next table shows the average yiparly Bank Rat-? from 1845 to 1900.^
1. "Bank Rate and .the Money Market" Palgrave pp. 70 and 71.
2. Ibid p. 33,
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Year i llate : Jear : Rate j Year Rat e_ ^.j^]^p,^r^. .f'P'^S.J^S^L\.I'2^?~.
T f-s-d : : f-s-d : : f-s-d : : f-c-d: : f-s-d
1845 2-13-8__ : 1856_:__6-l-2__ LM^J J ..^,'^9^2. J..^?^^ -I .^'i-l".^-!
1^B46_ j_ 3-6-6- : 1857_:_6-13-3 :J.868_ _2-l-ll _ :J._879 2-10-4j 1890: i-ip-5_
1848 : 3-14-5 : 1859 2-l'±-7 _ : 1870_: 3-2-0 i 1881_:_ 3j-iO_-Oj_ 1892j_ 2-^^^^
1849 : 2-13_-7^ : 1860 :
_ J_ 1_87_1 J 2-17-_d _ j_ _l«d2__:ji-2j-8_ 18_9_3 :_3^-^^^^^
1850 : 2-10-l_ j_ 1861 : 5-5j-4 1872 j_ J^Z^Z^- 1 I'^Xl^l i'i'L-
1853 : 3-13-10 : 1864 : 7-8-0_ : 1875 ^-±'^^
_ ± ^'}j-9}.]-§yi'J'rJ-L'l
18_54 5-2-3 :_1865 j_ >-15-4 ia76_:_ 2_-12--l_ j_ 18_8J_:^^^
1855 : 4-17-10 : 1866 : 6-19-0 : 1877 : 2-18-0 : 1888 : 3-5-11: 1899: 3-15-0

THE BA^IK OF FRAMCE.
The Bank of France is also the offspring of Govermneut financial dis-
tress. It was founded by Napoleon as a Government aid to tho first Empire.
In all its long history it has been a prop in French finances. During the
years 1830, ld48, lo70 and 1871 it gave the government incalculable aid.
It has always enjoyed an issue monopoly and this privilege v/as unlimited up
to March 15, l84d. At chat time the French legislature fixed the maximum
note issue at 350,000,000 francs and made T.he notes full legal tender. On
August 12, 1870 tiie limit was raised to 1,800,000,000 francs and finally
on February 11, 1906 the present limit 5,800,000,000 francs was authorized.
The Governor of the Bank of France recently said thax this increase in
is-ouB had followed the demands of commerce and that whenever it became
evident that more circulation was needed the French legislators upon the
advice of business :aen approved an increase by legislative authority. In
this respect we find the French syste:n a grea'c improvemenx over the
r.ore ririd and inelastic plan followed in England and the United States.
Like the Bank of England tne French institution is a bank of banks.
Its grec^t conservatism gives it the enjoyment of an unshaken public con-
fidence and French bankers look upon it as their chief help in tim.es of
financial panic. So successful has been the Bank's policy that France
boasts of the steadiest money rate in the world. The Bank of Franco acts
as the government's fiscal agent and conducts branches wiiich perform the
ordinary functions of banking in the various Departments.
1. Conant. History of Modern Banks of Issue Chapter III. Dunbar, Tlieorv
and History of Banking. Fiske^ The Modern Bank, p 293. Oilman.
A Graded Banking System p 2^. History of Banking in all 'Nations Vol.
Palgrave. Bank Kate & Money Market, p. 140- Report Special Com-
mittee N. Y, Chamber of Commerce, Appendix.
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The French bank statute seems to appreciate the propor function of
credit. The Bank is subject to the following rules in respect to loans.
Credit can be given only ui.on bills naturing within throe months and secured
by three signatures or tv^o signatures with a guaranty of a deposit of
securitiobi or by advances on proper securities or bullion and money. The
Bank alv/ays keeps un enormous reserve and the circulation not covered by
this cash reserve is really limited to the satisfaction of demands for dis-
ccunts. Thus circulation varies with com::iercial operations and France
enjoys u stable rate of interest.
The Bank has been an important factor as a support for railway
enterprises not only in France but also abroad. Wiienever an Anerican rail-
way company is in need of a great loan it can usually receive accOEmodation
at Paris. French railways have experienced similar reverses to those in
the United States. At a xime (1858) when railv/ay companies were being
floated in nearly every Department the stock of the new companies, which
had not yet had time to complete their lines, had fallen very low. A syn-
dicaxa of cntsc unfortunate roads appealed to xhe Bank for assistance.
A contract was signed between tae parties by which the Bank opened a credit
in favor of the railways upon the deposit of their stocks. The Bank also
agreed to act as railway brokers and sell the stock in the market at a
fair price. The contract v/as carried out to the letter. Over 240,000,000
francs of stock were sold and its market price rose from 260 francs to
290 francs within a year. :^or this gret^t service the Bank received as
interest on advances about 449,600 francs - a small sum wheji compared v/lth
the profits of the Aiaerican underwriter, llo Bank has ever withstood a

more severe strt^in than did the Bank of yraiice during and after the Prusso-
Franco V/ur (1870.) The Bank supported the govermsent ut the outset.
Four dt.ys after hostilities vere vott;d the Bank advanced '^0,000,000 francs
to the Crovernmenx. Other advances up to the close of the \mr medo a
total of 1,470,000,000 francs. During the war the Bank had never asked
for the suspension of specie payr-enxs although this step was taken by the
Government, August 12, 1870, in order to keep the gold in the country for
use in case of military necessity. At the close of the war the Bank took part
in the most remarkable transaction in the history of foreigii exchanges,
namely: the payment of a |l, 000, 000, 000 indemnity to Germany. This in-
demnity vus payable in installments and Tiie Bank advanced 1,530,000,000
francs to enable the Government to meet its first payiaents. Public loans
were placed for about 6,000,000,000 francs through the agency of the Bank
of France. These loans were over-subscribed and brought out the hoards of
French peasants and small shop keepers. Thus the loan sales not orJy freed
France from German troops but also swelled the monetary circulation so that
the Bank of France Vvitl^in a few years held a coin reserve neai-ly twice as
large as it had ever accumulated before. Aiiother incident worthy of mention
at this point, is the fact that foreign securities on the Paris market de-
clined greatly due to the Frenchman's desire to transfer his capital into
Goverrmient securities. The decline cf these ir.ternational securities re-
sulted in a flood of foreign money coming to Paris in order to take adv-
antage of the reduced prices of "the internationals."
The most important function of the Bank is its note issue. In late
years the practice cf making commercial discounts has been increasing.

especially the rediscounting business. Vhe rate of discount wus , for many
years, kept at approxiinately 47o. In the following table is shown the
principal items of the bank's accounts frora 1845 to 18^15.
Year
I'.'.ean :
Circulation :
iv.ean :
Metallic Reserve
iOtai
Discounts : Rate
1 ft4S 268 800 000fr
:
271,200,000 fr : l,399,300fr: 4.00
1848 : 347,800,000 : 176,200,000 : 1,537,400 : 4.00
i.oDU • 4'^i7 800 0(jO : 1,171,000 : 4.00_
ei44 400 OOO : 340,500,000 : 3,765,200 : 4.44
186C) : 7 3_bj 400,020 • 513,500,000 J _ 9,964,700_ J 3_.63
_1_86_5 : 843,800,£00
_
439,600,000 6,030_,__200 3_.7^ l|
_1870_
_
_j 1,566,400,000 _ 1,130, 700, 000_ 6,627, 300__ _ 3.99__
_1875
_
2,464,900,000 1,541,100,000 . 6,826,700 -ijPi
.41
1880 . d , oil ,WV ,U'jL) • 1 Q7/i ^on nnn 8 696 800 : 2.81
_1_885__
_
: 2,891,600,000
_
: 9,250,100 : 3.00
1890 : 3,076,600,000 : 2,476,700,000 : 9 , 549 , 700 : 3.00
__18y^ : 3,180,300,000 : ii,785,300,000_ : B, 41 5, 700 : 2_.50
J.893 : 3,423,000,000 : 2, 89 5_, 300,000 8,
9 2 200 :
_2.50
_189£ : 3,495,000,000 : 3,137,700,000
_ _
: 8,125,600 : 2.50
1895 : 3,^i84,900,000_
_
: 3,202,900,000 ^ _ 8_,521,_9_00 _ _2.00 ;
i. Conant. " History Modern Banks of Issue," p. 75
( r ( (
< t
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THE IMPElVtAL BAK'K OF GERMNY.
Germaai bankers boast that they have the best banking system and base
their opinion on the fact that they have profited by the financial exper-
ience of ether countries. The Reichsbank is the latest institution of
its kind. It wcs formed in ld7b witn the purpose of unifying the banking
system of the empire under xhe leadership of a strong central bank. It
WcxS considered a needed defence in case of a depleted Treasury and its
chief exponent declared it to be ihe last in Genaan nationalization. The
Bank of Prussia occupied a formidable position making it a natural center.
It had been established in 1765 and v/as governed largely by a Board cf
Directors v;ho received their appointment from the state. Prussia was a
chief stockholder and shared in its profits. There were also other strong
banks in the various Genaan states and thirty three- of them enjoyed the
right of note issue. These tanks were unregulated and there v/as not a
single characteristic of uniformity in the entire system. So, as preparatory
to central bank issue, the governmerrc took up the note issues of the
various states in 1874 and replaced them vith uniform Treasury Notes. The
power to grant note issue privileges v/as taken av/ay from the states and trans-
ferred to federal authority. By the law of 1375 note issue was apportioned
between the Bank of Prussia and the other thirty three banks of issue. The
rather stringent requiremetit of high capitalization for' banks of issue has
reduced the number of issuing banks to five : The Roichsbank, Bank of
1. Conant. A History of Modern Banks of Issue. Chapter 8, Dunbar, Theory &
History cf Banking. Fiske, The Modern Bank, p. 288, Gilman, A Graded
Banking System, p. 31 History -of Banking in all Ilatioirs '^ol. 3, Palgrave,
Bank Rate and Money Market p. 155, Quarterly Journal of l^conomics Vol. 14
Sound Currency Vol, 5, Ko, 21. Special Co:!:mittee of Hev. york Chamber
of Commerce, Appendix.
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Bavaria, Bunk of Saxony, Hank of Wurtenberg, a».d the Bank
of Baden.
The German Bank note io not legal tender and tlio ibsuing bank
ie
legally bound to redeem its notes in coin on deniand. "All
notes which
anyone of the five Lanks may issue, must be covered by coin and
gold bars,
or by bills of exchange having not more than three months
to run, but the
restrictions v/hereunder the Reichsbank may discount bills are
very severe
and under no circumstances must the coin and gold held be
less than
one third of the total circulation." ^ A much larger reserve is
always held. For instance the Managing director, of zhe Disconto
Gesell-
schaft, Belin says: " The most unfav)rable condition existed on
September
30, 1905, bv.t even chen the available funds, consisting
of coins and
governnent notes, constituted ^b.S^ of the actual amount of notes
in
circulation.
German banks of issue are required to pay a oax zo the Imperial Ex-
chequer " when their circulation exceeds the amount of coin and
gold held
plus an arbitrary amount fixed by experience at about ^2.00
per capita
of G«nnany's population."
^ This arbitrary amount is known as the "Kontin
4
gent" and the apportionment to each bank at present is as follows:
Name
Reichsbank
Bank of Bavaria
Bank of Saxony
Bank of Wurtemberg
Bank of Baden
472,829,000 Murks
32,000,000
16,771,000
10,000,000
10,000,000
( approximatelyj
^541
, 6 oo", 000 ' " ¥i^9.^'9P9j999^^Tot 0.1
1 "The Currency" Report Special Committee Chamber of Commerce
M.Y. 1906
2! ^ Same - Appendix p. 40. Appendix p. 37.
3. Sam.e - Appendix p. 37,
4. Same - Appendix p. 37<
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This tax is similar in principle to the graduated cax proposed
by "c-he Special GomiLtee of the American Bankers' Association, Wlien-
ever uny of the five banks iiicrease their issue over xhe upportioned amount,
they are required to pay 5 % on the excess into the Iiriperial Treasury,
The tax is payable by forty eights. Thus vmenever the vo'ikly balance sheet
shows an excess the tax is five forty eights percent on the over issue.
The Managing Director of tiie Deutciie Bank, Berlin thinks that," this stip-
ulation v/hich when introduced was quite new and an experiment has proved
a decided success." "'" The following table shews the excess cf circulation
2
over tae arbitrary "Kontingent" of the Reichs bank since 1876,
(Tlaousand Marks)
Year Overissue Year Overissue Yeur ; Overissue
. 1887 34,161
^
1898 : 737,199
_
1877 : 1888 ; None 189 9_ : _ 1,B50,325
_
18^78 1889 None : 1900 2,733,402
_
1879 226_^528_^ 1901
_
2,417,139
_^ _
_
1880^ ' 1891 325,082 1902 338,577
_
}^'^^ 1892 No ne : 1903 459,157
^
_
1882 2_6,_0&2 1893 None : 1904_ : 773,057
_
^
31^409
_
_
: 1894 ; 38,518 ; 1905 1,584,963
_
1884 None 1895 : None
_
1885 3.'.,679
_
: 215^080 J.
1886 : 2,615 : 1897 : M
,
209 :
1, The Currency" Report Special Conanittet; Chamber of Comi.ierce
Ne\v York, p, 37
2. Same p. 48
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Gennany lias her seasonal doraands for money whicli ocnur in tlie
latter part oi' Septeinber (harvest time) and the las'., of Doceraber when the
accounts of individuals and corporations are settled. Obviously wlien the
the
banks are led to over-issue, discount rate is advanced. 'Die Reiclisbank
A.
rarely iias to pay the tax for more than a week. The highest rate published
by the Reichsbank during its thirty years of existetice was from December
19, 18S9 to January 1, 1900 when the rate was 7fo. The official bank discount
1
rates have averaged as follows;
Five year periods.
Years
1876 - 1S80
Rate
1881_
18b_6^
IdSO
18a5_
1890
4.172f.
225
3^641
3.461
isop_
1905
4jj_420
3.85tISOi -
The advantages of the Reichsbank to GeiTflan commerce and trade may
well be summed in the words of Arthur Salononsohn, Managing Director of
2
the Disconto Gesellschaft, , Berlin: "The Reichsbank satisfies any in-
crease in the demand for money out of its ovm resources by enlarging its
issue of notes even to the extent of incui^ring the penalty prescribed by
lav/ in the event of an over-issue; while on the other hand by the control
of its rate of discount it prevents ur.due expansion of its circulation.
1, "The Currency". Report of Special Conanittee of Chamiier of Conii:ierce,
Mew York, p. 41.
2. Same p. 42.
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Througii zhe regulation of its discount rate it exerts a controlling in-
fluence upon domestic business affairs and upon the international novements
of £Old. The Reichchank guards the Gei'man monetary systeni against out-
side interference ur\d encourages or hinders by means of its discount pol-
icy the inflov/ or outflov/ of gold. The Bank mintains under all circum-
stances an adequate stock of gold, from which at all times foreign demands
can be met v/i Jiout in any way affecting the integrity of the monetary sys-
tem. "
MiERICAIJ CEIiTRAL BAI-IK EXPEPJEl'CE.
We have seen that a central bank with certain monopoly features is
regarded by Europeans as tne best means of supplying the proper credit mach-
inery. Experience seems to favor the operations of these banks in their
respective countries. There are many institutions thriving on foreign
soil, hov/ever, v/hich the average American citizen will not tolerate at
the present time. The American scheme of governirent is demiOcratic and
from its very conception the fathers tried to avoid any approach to the
old monarchial practices. Hence, politically, a vast m.ajority of the
people have rather feared the suggestion of any agency so pov^erful as a
central bank, Tiie United States ;:as had tvo banks^imilar in character
to the central oanks of Europe, and each v^as given up after a bitter pol-
itical struggle.

THE FIRST BANK OF THE U'lITED STATES.
Alexander Hamilton, the first Secretary of the Treasury v/us a great
friend of centralized govornraent. In the framing of the constitution and
at all other times he shov/ed a desire to make tr.e federal goveriuneiit strong
and eff'ictive. When he set about to frame a na^ioniU financial policy
coe of his v^Bt scne;r;s was the creation of a National Bank. During the first
years public credit was very weak. There had been no systeia or regularity
in ths fisG>4.i i--olicies of the various states and their finances were in a
deplorable condition. Over the new government hung a great v/ar debt which
Kaiailton felt must be met if the states would win the respect cf nations.
In a paper submitted to Congress, December 13, 1790, he proposed the establish-
ment of a strong bank as a measure for improving the existing fiscal con-
ditions. He urged that a central bank v/ould be a great vault in which would
accuraulate innumerable individual deposits which when concentrated could be
put to use in an effective manner; this v/ould increase the actual capital
of the country by making it possible to issue paper money v/ith safety and
unifcrLiity and industry vv'ould flourish on account of the credit supplied;
with its ample capital it \/ould make it easier for the government to obtain
loans; the individual would find it easier to pay liis taxes and he would
have a greater opportunity to bori-ow necessary capital; there v/ould also
undoubtedly be an increj.se in the circulation of money.
1. Clarke & Hall. Legislative and Dccujaentai History of the United
States, pp. 15. 85. 116.
Conant. History of Modern Banks cf Issue. 'jHapter 13,
Dewey. A Financial History of the United States, pp.98, 160.
Fiske, The Modern Bank p. 362,
History of 'Batiking in all Nations. Vol. I,
Sumner. History of Araericaji Currency
t
Ti.roughout the country there wiis considorable opposition to any
form of bunk and Hamilton in defence of his policy sliowed how banks "help
ihe industrious j;nd honest r,e . by furnishing them capital," In reply to
the arguiaent for government issue of paper money Hamilton urged the gen-
erally accepted objection, namely: thut a government cannot well supply the
demands of trade ajid it is often tempted z^i over- issue in times of financial
distreas. Htuoilton's idea of banic currency may well be siimrned up in the
following passage; " Gold and silver, when they are employed merely as
instruL'iynts of exchange and alienation have been, not improperly, denominated
dead stock; but when deposited in banks to become the basis of paper cir-
culation, v/hich takes their place as signs or representatives of value,
they tnen acquire life, or in other words, an active productive quality."
Hamilton's proposal met with strenuous opposition when it was discussed
in the House of Representatives, Madison questioned the constitutionality
of the measure ai-d declared the Constitutional Cciiveriticn had neglected to
give Congress the power to incorporate because the framers feared that it
woula give Congress the power to incorporate a bank. This always occupied
the most attention in debates over the Bank , Many distrusted tlie Bank on
the ground tiiat it would become a great money power which would pit thu
rich against the poor and thus defeat the vital purpose of a democracy. There
was also a sectional feeling that the city with its diversified industries
v/ould' profit at the expense of th.e agricultural interests. This opposition
csjrae from the southern planter who complained that only federal stocks were
to be used in subscribing to the stock oi thy Bank and the North possessed
the most of them.

The Churtcir passed the House on February 25, i.y a vote of
39 to 20, It is interesting to note th^.t three votes nortli of the
Potonac were againsi it and three votes south of uhe Potomac favored it.
The First hank of tiie United States wcs (chartered for twenty years, i^nd
was located i^t Philadelphia. The charter provided for a capital stock
of 110,000,000 of \,hich oi^e fifth v/as to be subscribed by the govern-
ment. The reinai-ider of the stock was open to Anerican or foreign citizens
but no foreigner was to act as a director and only Araerican stockholders
could vote by proxy. One fourth of the stock open to popular subscription
was payable in specie and three fourths in geverninent securities bearing
6% interest. No private subscription was xo exceed one thousand shares.
The Bank might begin operations after ^400, 000 in gold and silver had
been paid in and Congress was zo charter no other bank.
The management of the institution was given to twenty five directors,
seven of v/hon constituted a quoruia to transact business. One fourth of the
directors were elected annually. One share entitled the holder to one
vote; thret shares to t\/o votes etc. The maximum rate of interest to
be charged was placed at 6;l. Mo real estate (except banking house ) v/as
to be owned except 'chat received through foreclosure; it wc:S also forbiddai
to buy or sell p;oods except forfeited collateral. The United States Gov-
ernment could never borrow more than vlOO,000 from the Bank unless sanctioned
by an act of Congress. Foreign powers were never to be favored with a
loan. The Barik might buy but could not sell govermaent bonds.
When the subscription books were opened the stock was over-subscribed
by four thousand shares within two hours. The Bank began operations on

December 12, Soon afterward eight branches were established a^ Boston,
Nev/ York, Washington, Norfolk, Charlestov/n, Savannali and IIe\/ Orleans.
There are no official records whic!: give any idea of the Bank's
business during its ciiarter existence. Secretary Gallatin said that the
Bank v/as merely Ci^lled upon to !ni*.ko " a general sti^tenent" of its affairs.
This undoubtedly grev, out of tiie old idea that all banking business should
be held secret; for one Secretary was given tlie power to inspect the books
of the Hank and call for weekly reports fron the officials. Tliere ex-
ists but one detailed report to Secretary Gallatin. This was laade in
January 1811 and shows the following:
Discounts 14, 500,000; Loans to the United States $2,700,000; due
from other banks ip900,000; Cash ^^5,000,000; private deposits §6,000,000;
public d6p.)sitb 1^3,000,000; bank deposits ?200,000; and circulating notes
|5, 000, 000.
As an assistar^t to the government, the Bank did invaluable ser-
vice. It first loaned the government |2, 000, 000 and follo\.Qd this by
other loans uade in anticipation of taxes. By 1796 the government owed
it |6, 200, 000. On account of financial pressure the Bank demanded pay-
ment and the government wus compelled to sell part of its bank stock in
17V6 and 1797 and in 1802 the United States parted with the remainder
of its holdings. At that time the bank stock was at a premium and the
Barings resold some shares at as nigh as 150 in London. The total pre-
mium obtained by the government on its five thousand shcu.res v/as |b71,8cO,
During the time it held the stock "it received $1,101, 7<iO iji dividends. One
of the most important fiscal advantages of the Bank was the caring for public
funds.
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Tho principal soarce of national income was the castoir.s Ju.J.cs v/hich vsre
collected at various ports miles apart. There vera fev local banks
v^hicii could have been used as depositories during the first years of the
government. Hov/evor, towards the close of the bank's career this advantage
was partly eliminaied in-as-uiuch that eleven local banks had the custody
of at least o>ie t'lird of the public funds in the year 1811.
Notwithstanding the large advances made to the government and the
beneficial work of the branches there was strong opposition to the recharter
of the Bank. Public opinion was opposed to the so-called bank monopoly
This is well expressed ir a letter written by Jefferson to Gallatin as early
as 1303 in which he said: " I am decidedly in favor of making all banks
republican by sharing deposits ainongst them in proportion to the dispositions
they shov/. " The Bank charter expired in 1811 and the stockholders peti-
tioned for a renev/al in 1303. Up to this ti;ae the Bank iiad paid an annual
dividend of over 8fo and hence was very popular v/ith its owiiers. Secretary
Gallatin was a strong adherent of the Bank and gave itsadvantages in a re-
port to Congress on March 9, 1809. He claimed that it aided the govern-
ment as a saf= depository for public monies; by transferring na&ional funds,
by collecting reserves and furnishing loans. The opposition contended that
the Bank was largely owned by foreigners (two thirds of stock) and that it
had used its power to further the interests of political allies so that
discounts were given to favorites rather than xhe public in general. Atv/atnr
pamphlet - a paper on "Considerations on the Dissolution of the United
States Bank" - declared that "oiio bank like that of the United States will
destroy the industrious habits of one thousand fajnilies annually.
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Think of the locusts of Egypt. These were to the people procisely v;hat banks
are to the farmers." In Congress there was an echo of those warnings.
Stat'ri bankers had implored their representatives to defeat :he recharter
raeasure.O i account of a misunderstanding in regard to Federal appointments
in Philadslphia, Wixliarn Duone and Wicheal Lieb because enemies of Gallatin
and with the help of Secretary of zh^ State Sraith and his following began a
vigorous campaign against the Bank. Gallatin was ably represented in the
Senate by V*. H. Crawford of Georgia. In a debate Senator Crawford maintained
that foreign stockholders had no vote and thut should the Bank go into
liquidation a vast amount of coin would leave the couutry. The House was
particularly sensitive on the subject of the constitutionality of the Bank
and cii Januai-y 24, 1811 voted against recharter by a vote of 65 to 64, In
the Senate the vote resulted in a tie. (February 20,1811) and Vice President
George Clinton, an enemy of Gallatin, cast the deciding vote against the bill.
Wlien it became certain that Congress would not grant a new charter,
the stockholders applied to the legislature of Pennsylvania. They were
unsuccessful and the Bank began winding up its affairs. The soundness
of the institution is evidenced by the fact tliat after all liabilities were
paid the stockholders received four hundred and thirty four dollars for every
four hundred dollar share.
Local banks were cliosen as government depositories and within a
year "the cash balance of the Treasury was deposited with twenty one banks.
No financial disturbance was evident during liquidation. Soon came the sec-
ond war \«ith Great Britiar.. It wa's utterly impossible to transfer funds from
one part of the country to ano oher to any advantage because state bank

liotes only circulated in a limited locality. Adderl to this was the sus-
pension of specie payments in 1814. As a remedy for the difficulty, Dallas-
v/ho succoaded Gailatin - recomTiended a new national bank similar to the
First United States Bank. He was strongly opposed by Daniel Vi'ebster who
favored the establishment of a bank for commercial purposes raxher than
one with dominant adnini strative influence. V/ebsxer's proposal passed the
House by a vote of 120 to 38 and the Senate by 20 to 14 but was vetoed by
the President on January 30, 1815.
V/hen Congress jaet the following December President Madison recom-
mended a national bank in his arjiual message. It is interesting to note
that Ur, Madison opposed the First United States Bank on constitutional
grounds but the great clamor for the resumption of specie pa^/ments seems to
have cleared away his former objections. Calhoun, another strict construct-
ionist, was one of the advocates in favor of a new bank. The most prominent
opponent of the bill was John Randolph vvho suid in a speech.: " A bank would
be an engine of irresistable pov/er in the hands of any adninistration ; it
would be in politics and finance what the celebrated principle of Archimides
was in physics. - a place, a fulcrum from which at the will of the exe-
cutive the whole nation could be hurled to destruction." Clay changed
his fonner viev;s and supported the bill on the ground that a bank was nec-
essary to treasury operations. On March 14, IBlo the bank bill passed
the House by a vote of 80 to 71; later it passed the Senate and was
signed by the President on .April 10, 1816,

mmt^^ mm
THE SECOND UIJITED STATES BAJIK.
The Second Bank of the United States had a capital of ^^35, 000, 000
of which one fifth wt.s oo be subscribed by the Government i}i money or its
ov/n bonds; three fourths of the remaining capital was payable in the
funded debt of the United States. Its charter had a twenty year duration
during which tiiae no similar institution should be authorized by Congress
outside of zhe District of Columbia. The Government was to be paid a
bonus of 1500,000 annually for three years after the end of the second year
as a return for the charter privilege. The bank wtj.s also required to
transfer the public funds without cominission. Public moyiey v/as to be
deposited v/ith the Bank unless the Secretary of the Treasury deemed it best
tc deposit elsev/here in which case he was required to ,r';ive proper reasons
to Congress immediately. There were to be twenty directors chosen by the
stockholders and five ( from stockholders) additional appointed by the
President. Only United States stockholders could vote by proxy. Reports
of the Bank's condition might •e demanded by the Secretary of the Treasury not
oftener than O'lce a week and the President of the United states was given the
pov/er to issue a writ of "scirij facias" requiring the Bank to shew why its
charter should not be forfeited. Mote issue v/as limited to the amount of
the capital stock and the Government of the United States would receive
United States Bank Notes as legal tender in the payraent of debts.
1, Catterall. The Second United States Bank.
Conant. History of Modern Banks of Issue. Chapter 13.
Clarke & Hall. Legislative^ and Documental History of the
Bank of the United States.
Dewey. A Financial History of the United States, pp. 144, 1^8,
Fiske. The Modern Bank, p. 302.
History of Banking in all Nations, Vol I.
Sumner, History of Aiaerican Currency.
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Tlie Bank bega)i business or January 7, 1817 under questionable cir-
cumstances. During its firsx years it was badly rnanaged and was at the
of
brink of i-isolvency. Instead^the $7,000,000 required to be paid m specie,
only about |2, 000, 000 was received and the personal notes of stockholders
were taken instead of the lef^al Govenmient securities. There v/as an active
speculation in bank stocks and it is charged that even the president and
other bank officials were implicated in this greedy procedure. Loans \7ere
made on the United States Bank stock as ccllateral and nany stockholders
received dividends before paying in the requisite subscription. The
eighteen branches of the Bank locked up the notes of local banks and charged
interest upon them and thus oppressed state banks instead of cooperating to
restore bank credit. The western branches expanded their discounts by
an endless chain method of issuing drafts upon one another. After two
years the branch at Baltimore collapsed with a loss of |3, 000, 000 due to red:-
less management and illegal operations. Congress becairie alarmed and a bill
was introduced in January 1819 to set aside the charter. Th.ere is no doubt
that this would liave been done had not the stockholders tactfully elected
Langdon Gheves as President of the corporation. Mr. Cheves was a conservative
business man and he at once proceeded to put the Bank on a safe footing by
borrowing |2, 500,000 in specie from the Barings in London. He forbade
southern and western branches to issue notes when the exchanges were against
themi This hud the beno-^icial effect of preventing overissue. During the
four years of his admini titration Mr. Gneves pursued a safe policy which
was greatly to the advantage of Com erce and the Government. Senator Smith
of I^iaryland in 1832 claimed that " it (The Bank) furnished a currency as
safe as silver, more conveniei-it, and more valuable than silver." i'he rates of
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domestic exchange were appreciably reduced by the Bank ut a time when the
means of conmunice^tion were inefficient. Tlie Government was ulso provided
with u servicable organization of depositories. An illustration of the
bank policy of Ur. Claeve may be found ir; the follov^dng table:
Jfear
1817_
_iai8
Chaves^ 1819
18 23^
1822
1823
Circula tion
_
. f. 1,911,poo
8,339,000_^
_6,563__,000
.
3j_5_3 9 , OpO
4,5_67_,000
4,361,000
Loans
^
3_,'i85,000_
41_,181^0_q0_
35,786,000
31,jt01,000
_30_,905_,000_
_28_,qol_,000^
30,736,000
The constitutionality of the Bank was passed upon by the Supreme
Court of the United States in the celebrated case of Lie Gullcch against
Maryland. In 1818 the Maryland legislature imposed a tax on the notes
of the United States Bank and its branches. Tht Cashier, Mr. McGulloch
refused to pay the tax and the ca. e finally reached the Supreme Court. Chief
Justice Harshall in delivering the opinion (1819) laid down the rule that
the power to create a national bank, to assist in the Govcrnraent* s fiscal
policy, was within the implied powers of the Constitution. Ke declared that
the Constitution of the United States did not prohibit the states from tax-
ing the real property of the Bank within the state but it did imply the
power to take av/ay from states the right to tax em instrument cf govenuiient.
1. Dewey. "Financial History of the United States." p. 153.
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Ohio also attempted to tax the notes of the Unitf^d states Bank. In the
case known as Osbourne et al against the United States Bank (1824) Chief
Justice Marshall reiterated his former decision and suid the United States
Bank was created for a national purpose. Following these precedents all
United States securities have been non-taxable excepo by express consent
of Congress,
Although the bank had received the sanction of the Supreme Court,
it was still confronted by its old enemies. After the successful admin-
istration of Gheves, Nicholas Bidd.le assumed the presidency in 18E3, I'/hen
I'x, Biddle took charge the Bank had a circulation of some i*)4, 300,000;
specie 54,400,000; public deposits ("2,700,000; privt.te deposits |3, 300, 000;
loans 30,700,000; i.nd United States bonds .111,000,000. By 1S2F. the active
capital had been increased by the sale of from |3, 000, 000 to ^£4, 000, 000 of
stock which had been received as collateral on stock exchange operations.
An unfortunate action on the part cf the Board of "directors occurred soon
after this change of policy. It was urged that the branches openly evaded
the lav/ by issuing drufts to circulate as monoy. This operated as an un-
fair competition v/it:i state bank issues and also contained an element of
inflation. These drafts in denominations of §5, ilO and •v20 were in common
circulation in the south and west and v/ere accepted in payments to the United
3
States Treasury. The branch drafts outstanding in April 1832 were §7,410,000.
It is interesting to note that there v/as but little United s'l^ates bank cir-
culation in Mew England during the career of the Bank.
1. Journal of Comjierce and Commercial Bulletin " A History of Banking
in all Nations Vol I p. 183.
2. Same p. 185,
3. JournsQ. cf Commerce and lommercial Bulletin " A Plistory of Banking
in all Nations Vol. I p. 186,
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The following table shows the distribution of the Bank's circulation in
1818, 1823 and lS3'i. ^
Section : Sept. 30, 181^? : Jan, <i, xodo Apr, 4, iod<i
Naw England : Jjl_8_,JD00 1 393,000 (i _901^,000__
Middle States : „y£9..000_
_ _ _ _
: 868,000__ 5,478j,_000^
_
South 3,960,000__
_
£,281,000 _5_,3ll_j000
Southv/est
_6 70_j000_ : 744 , 000_
_ _
5,637j^000
_817,0p0 J 45^,000 J 5_,131^000_
T o_ t aj.___
_
.
: 6^,93_4,^00 : _22,458_,000
An open war on the Bank was begun by President Jackson in his first
annual message to Congress in 1829, His statements fell as a great surprise
to the financial world v/hich recognized the Bank as being of groat value
notwithstanding the petty quarrels at various local points, Jackson
charged the Bank with being inefficient in providing " a uniform and sound
currency" and said that ths majority of the citizens of xhe United States
were still doubtful as oo its ccistitutionality. His complaint v/as due to
the dissatisfaction of Isaac 4ill, a Vev Hampshire politician ,who claimed
that the branch in his state had shown partiality to the opposing party,
Bidale denied that the Bank had any favorites and even declared that the
Boa^'d of Directors acknov/ledged no responsibility to the Secrtroary o'f the
Treasury and that it v/us in no way under executive control. It seems that
Mr. Biddle over-looked the fact that public deposits might be withdravm.
1. Dewey "Financial History of the United States," p, 153.

The el feet of President Jackson's hostility to the Pank wtis scon evident
for its shares of stock fell from or'.e hundred and thirty xo one hundred
and sixteen after the annual message of 1829. Both houses of Congress
left the charge against tlie i^ank to Cornmittees. On April 30, 1830 I cDuffie
made a report in which he defoi:ded the constitutionality of the Bank and
exonerated it from the charge of bad management. In the Senate, Smith
reported from the Committee on Finance in favor of the Bank and its policy
and dwelt especially on the national character of United States Bank Notes,
xhe House, on I.lay 10, 1830 tabled a resolution not to renew the Bank charter
by a vote of 8t to 66 and on May 29th it tabled resolutions calling for a
detailed report of the procedure of the Bank. There was also a similar
sentiment in the Senate. As a result of this vindication, Bank stock rose
to one hundr'ed and thirty. In his messages of 1830 and 1831, the President
was mild in the criticism of the Bank and the Secretary of th- Treasury in
his annual report in 1831 made a strong argument in favor of it.
Jackson's hostility was renewed by the political tact.'cs of Henry
Clay who as a presidential candidate wished to make recharter a national
issue. Clay wanted the support of the financial men of the country and
really forced the issue upon Jackson, It has been said that had it not been
for this political strategy it is probable that the administration would
have given up its opposition to a recharter. Biddle and other bank officials
tried hard to avoid making recharter a party issue but they were forced
to join Clay or be v/ithcut political friends. In the Presidential cam-
paign Jackson was re-elected by a vote of 219 electoral votes to 4S for
Clay and 18 for all others. This result decided the fate of the Bank,
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Jackson nov.- had the sujiport of the public more firmly than ever and ho
made definite plans to fulfill the party's pledge. On January 5, 1832,
Dallas introduced a bill for a renewal of the charter in the Senate and
McDufiie presented a similar resolution in the House. This resulted in
a contest between the friends of Clay and the adherents of Jackson. Both
Houses passed the bill but the President promptly vetoed it. (July 10, 1832).
Congress was unable to overcome .he President's veto and stubbornly refused
his recommendations that the government ro out of the banking business.
In order to use his power, the President was oblip;ed to change his
Secretary of the Treasury Mr. LlcLsno, v;ho was a friend of the Bank, as
was his successor William J. Duane. Taney, however, upon assuming the office
acted in accordance with the President's wishes. Then began the removal
of public deposits from the Second Bank of the United States. On September
26, 1832, the new Secretary issued an order directing the deposit of public
money in certain state banks - later styled Jackson's "pet banks". Tlie
removal of funds v/as done through the issue of drafts on the Bank for the ord-
inary expenditures of the aovernment. It is unnecessary to dwell upon
the various arguments against President Jackson's action in this matter.
It is sufficient to say that the President had won his point and that this
determined definitely the recharter of the Bank,
The bank of the United States obtained a charter from the state
of Pennsylvania on February 18, 1836 for thirty years. The shares owned
by the United States were paid in full in four installments at the rate of
115.58, The capital was kept intact at §35, 000, 000 but tiiis proved by
far too large for local needs. The management began to branch out into
loans of uncertain value and its losses were enormous duri>ig the crisis
of 1837.

56
It wuB compelled to suspend with the banks during the panic and finally
in 1341 went into liquidation. All of its creditors wera paid in full
but the stockholders lost the entire capital stock.
The principal items of tiie Second Bank of the United States from
1820 to its fi.ial suspension are shown in the following table:
Year ; Loans : Deposits : Circulation Specie
1320 ; 531,401,158
_
{5 6,568,794 : 1 3,598^481 ^ 3,392,755
_1830 40,_663j_805 : 1£,045_,_782 12,_92fijli5 : 7,608,076
1834 : 54,911,461 ! 10,838,555 : 19,208,379 : 10,039,237
_18^35 _5_1,808,739 : 17,339,797 : 15,708,369
_1B36_ 59,232j^445 23_,_0;75,_4_22^
_
:__ 8^417,988
1837 57,393,709 2,332,409 11,447,968 ! 2,638,449
1838 45,256,571 2,616,713 6,768,067 3,770,842
__1_839
_j- .J 6,779,394 ; 5,982,621 : 4,153,607
1840 :
__36_j839j_593 :
. _
238^,_521
_6_^69_5,861
__ J 1,469,674
Before leaving "che subject of the Second Bank of the United States
it might be well to examine some of the charges brought against it. The
whoie truth of the Bank's affairs is not known and this shows clearly the
inefficiency of its supervision. It was charged that the Bank had asked
discount and exchange rates which exceeded the 6°- limit. This viola-cion
was undoubtedly true and indicates the practice common among bankers, even
ax present, of avoiding the usury law. During its existence the Bank v/as
at times obliged to take realestate from its debtors. This property was
1, Conant "History of Modern Banks of Issue" p. 307
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of ten improved and rentod. As a matter of business expediency, it is con-
ceivable that a bank may hold property for a better market in order to
protect its stockholders and creditors. On two occasions the Bank sub-
scribed to the stock of turnpike companies. This was a practice of dan-
gerous possibilities and canrot redound to the credit of the Bank's policy.
There was also a complaint that the Bonk was subsidizing the press. This
objection was met by a counter -charge that state banks had forced the
practice. V-liatever may be the truth ;;f the controvorsy, the fact remains
that a strong money power can never control tlie press completely. Americans
should feel enough confidence in their institutions to discredit the idea
that a central bank or any group of banks could ever control a free press
effectively. It is natural to expect that favoritism would exist in a
central bank. Friends of the Bank v/ould undoubtably be given credit in
preference to strangers. No human law can ever alter this condition. The
evil is evident when one man or group of men receive unreasoiiable loans
in proportion to their collateral. The proper exercise of lending money
in such a case depends, primarily, upon the personnel of the management.
That the Second United states Bank made unsafe, locuis to a cousin of its
President is very probable. On October 15, 183o Mr. Biddle had |1, 131, 672
on the Bank's funds at 57! interest. There is no proof thu-z this loan was
not properly secured. If it was not, the fault lay with the officers
rather thc..n with the Bank as a central institution. An important charge
against the Bank was that between September 1, ld31 and April 1, 1832 the
note circulation had expanded |l, 300, 000 while its discounts were appreciably
reduced the Congressional investigation showed, however, that there was on
hand some |9, 640, 000 in cash to meet |42,600,000 in liabilities. This

looks bad on che face ol but the condition of banks at that time v/ould
warrant the assertion that very few were able to make a better showing.
Jaeksoi's s-urong objection that the Bank did not provide " a uni-
form and safe currency" is hardly accepted at present. On page 53 of this
paper is a table which shows that the Bank wcs of little influence in Hew
i^Ingland where tiie banks v/ere practicint- a sane note issue. There is no
doubt, however, that the south and the west v/ere greatly helped by the sta-
bility Qf the United States Bank notes. The strong opposition in these
sections cane not from the people theL-.selves but from the state banks which
were eager for govermr.ent deposits and desired to expar^d their own note
issues.. The serious evils of the state bank issue are coimacn knowledge.
Beside, the lack of ujiiformity of issue and the possibility of "wild cat"
banking, counterfeiting w.-. s made easy o-: account of the numerous forms in
circulation. In 1862 there wei'e counterfeits on the notes of two hundred
and fifty threw r^anks und the best known bank currency was at a discount
of from 1;4 to 15% in business centers, ihe notes of the Second United States
Bank, on the o.ther hand, circulated at par and were always redeemable at
the various branch counters. There is no doubt that the south and west'
were beise^'ited through the f:uida)ice of the Bank note issue.
liie Bank also m.ade an enviable record in the management of the public
funds. The policy of President Biddl© was to consider the embarrassments
incident to the withdrawl of a. large amount of public funds from the
chanrfels of trade. His action in tryirg' to adjust the pa^^^aent of public
dues in accordance with the condition of the money market is now thought
essentitd by our best financiers. It has been a great proVjiem for the
Secretary of the Treasury to do this under the sub-treasury system.
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The effect of the defect of the Second United States Bank is shown
by the phenomenal growth of state banks. They grew up like mushrooms.
In 1837 ohere were 788 state banks with a capital of ^291,000,000,
^140,301,038 circulation, $127,000,000 deposits, and f5525 , 000,000 loans
and discounts. By 1840 there were 901 st£vXe banks and branches v/ith
^106,968,572 circulation. ^ No doubt this growth v/as partly stimulated by
the adi]ii.ni strative hostility of the United States Bank and the hope of se-
curing jovernment deposits. Then followed the panic of 1837 and tht; sus-
pension of specie payments due to an inflated credit system. Later, in
1846, the independent treasury wt^s inaugurate ; and it has since served as
the receivinsr and disbursing agent of the United states Croverninent.
C N C L U S I M,
In the foregoing sections v/e have discussed the relative merits and
defects of the Americcn and European banking systems. American bank
currency is safe and uniform. French and German bank currency not only has
these essential qualities but is also elastic and responds- to the legi-
timate demands of commerce and industry. American bank note iseue
depends, primarily, upon the investment conditions of government- securities
and therefore operates under the uneconomic principle of allowing the rise
of public credit to hamper the extension of bank credit. Consequently
trade suffers the- most at the very time when proper credit facilities
should give it the greatest help.
The public moneys of the united States - except those cus-ooms duties
ana internal revenues deposited v/ith national banks upon approved se-
curity - are kept in a sub-treasury and its branches. The public
1. Dewey. "Financial History of the United States." p. 225 table.
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mcneys of Europe are deposited in the great central' banks v/bich act as
the fiscal agents of their govormcents. The result is that /jneric£<n in-
dustry suffers whenever any large treasury receipts or disburseirients occur
while p]uropean irivestcrs und nanufacxurers always have at their disposal
the money not actually needed in government fiscal operations. In both
'the United States and Europe the national securities have a steady market,
but in the former it is at the partial expense of private credit v/h.ile in
the latter the proper expansion and contraction of credit i^ allov/sd.
In all parts of England, France and Crermany there is a practically
ilniform and steady discount rate. The /juorican system of banking does not
give all sections a fair rate of interest. This is partially due to the
fact that parts cf the Union are still nev arid undeveloped but the absence
of branch banking and the lack of a cooperative system adds largely to the
difficulty. The Vfes.ern and Southern states suffer because the strong city
banks cannot have their representatives in those loan fields and progress
is curtailed in aaiiy places capable of immediate development. Moreover,
tne American system is competitive to a degree that each, bank locks only
to its own position c.t a tim.e of stringency when cooperative action would
be more desirable.
European central banks can alv/ays influence the in-flow and out-flov/
of gold. The United States can do little to defend itself in this matter.
In order to be a potent factor in international exchanges it is necer-bary
to have a steady home market where paper can be rediscounted at any moment.
The EnglisJi, French and German, institutions perfona this service adrrdrably.
Thus when money is tight in Germany, the P.nglish and French immediately
invest in German bills. This makes a demand both at home and abroad
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and insuroB a rapid udjusiment to nomcil conditions.
The United States has h.ad central hank experience, Fconomically
it has proven successful. The Firtt United States hank did much to
restore puhlic credit end performed an invaluable service us a government
depository in the eerly days of the Republic, Fnen the second war v/ith
Groat Britian cane, tl:e First United States Bank had been abolished but
the need for a central institution was so pressing that many statesmen changed
their views and urged the establislmient of a similar bank in order to hasten
the resxmption of specie paym.ents. The Civil V/ar was financed v/ith the
aid of an inadequate banking system and although great help was secured
through various bank syndicates and the work of individuals, it v/as thought
best to enact a national bank lav»' and provide a safe and uniform currency.
V/hile we have secured this end, v;e have seen th^.t the present law is de-
fective in other respects. The defects could easily be remedied should
we allov/ some responsible agency with adequate resources to supply conmere e
with an elastic currency, relieve the cumbersome treasury syste;a and in-
sure a more steady rate of interest throughout the country, A study of
the Bank of France and the Imperial Bank of Germany substantiates this
statement. Should the United States incorporate a bank of banks, ovmed by
the various banking associations v/hich would issue emergency currency and
act as the fiscal agent of the governnent the uneconomic features of the
American system would disappear. However, one great difficulty yet re-
mains v;hich must be overcome.
Public opinion is temporarily of greater moment than even sound
economic principles,. In no other country is this force more dominant than
in the United States,
.
Sometimes it acts upon its ovvn initiative but usually

it IS shaped by the leudors of the great political parties, Tlie Second
United States Bank waa e. victiir: of party politics uivi failed to be recharter-
ed as a result of a presidential campaign. Tliis happened during an era
of refonn and iz m s generally believed that the Bank was a dangerous uoney
monopoly. At present there is a general fear of tlie money power. The prtss,
statesnen and politicians are agitating against any form of raonopoly. A
central bunk, although not possessing a banking monopoly, would be looked
upon with suspicion by the average vVmerican. He would regard it as a
means of putting greater power into the hands of V.'all Strout and corporation
men. The newspapers, magazines and district politicians would agitate
agaiiist it. This makes the question of the advisability of establish-
ing a central bank in the United States primarily a political 0!'e.
It has been suggested that a central bank be organized which would
be owned entirely by the banks themselves and not partially by the govern-
ment. This would tend to eliminate partisan conflicts. The United
States has learned that the frequent changes iv the party in pov/er would
make the bank management too uncertain if its officers were men of political
appointment. Not until this country has established a strong Civil Service
can government ownership be kept above politics. A bank owned by banks
would be more apt to be successful but such an institution although econ-
omically desirable is politically impossible under present conditions.
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